Ralf Michaels

Globalizing Savigny?
The State in Savigny's Private International Law
and the Challenge from Europeanization and Globalization

119

I. Introduction *
1) Uberseering and the "Obsolescence of Traditional Private International Law"

On November 5, 2002, the European Court of Justice rendered its decision in
Uberseering. 1 Uberseering was a company originally incorporated in the Netherlands,
which had later transferred its effective seat of administration to Germany. Under German
law, the effective seat determines the law applicable to a company. Thus, Uberseering was
now a German company that was not in compliance with German company law and thus
lacked legal personality. Arguably, the company therefore had no locus standi to bring suit
before German courts. The Court of Justice held that this violated the Treaty and that
Germany was obliged to grant locus standi. 2
This was the third time that the Court dealt with the legal personality of companies
acting in a state different from that of their incorporation. 3 In its Daily Mail decision in
1988, 4 the Court had held that "unlike natural persons, companies are creatures of the law
and, in the present state of Community law, creatures of national law. They exist only by
virtue of the varying national legislation which determines their incorporation and
functioning."s Consequently, it allowed the United Kingdom to condition the newspaper's change of its corporate seat to the Netherlands on the satisfaction of its tax liability
in the u.K. In 1999, the Court rendered its CentlVs decision. 6 Two Danish citizens, in
order to avoid the high registration costs under Danish law, had established a private
Limited Company in England, Centros Ltd (with only nominal minimum capital which
was never paid) and set up a subsidiary in Copenhagen. They were only interested in the
subsidiary. Centros Ltd itself never became active and had no connection to England and
Wales other than the incorporation. Therefore, Denmark wanted to treat the subsidiary as a
Danish company, and refused registration unless the fees for Danish companies had been
paid. The European Court of Justice ordered the Danish authorities to register the
subsidiary, arguing that Centros Ltd had been incorporated legally under u.K. law, and
the EC Treaty gave companies a right to form branches in other member states. The earlier
Daily Mail judgment was not mentioned.
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The text is essentially in the fonn in which it was submitted in the spring of 2003; only some newer
references have been added.
Judgment of Nov II, 2002, Case C-208/00, Uberseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company
Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), [2002] E.C.R.
Before the Court of Justice decided Uberseering, the Gennan Bundesgerichtshof held that foreign
companies with an effective seat in Gennany had locus standi: Bundesgerichtshof, July 1,2002,2002
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 3539 = 23 Praxis des Internationalen Privatrechts (IPRax) 62,
note Kindler p. 41; cf. Stefan Leible & Jochen Hoffmann, Vom "Nullum" zur Personengesellschaft
Die Metamorphose der Scheinauslandsgesellschaft im deutschen Recht, 55 Der Betrieb (DB), 2203
(2002).
A fourth case is Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art
Ltd, [2003] E.C.R. 10155.
Judgment of Sep 29, 1988, Case C-81187, The Queen v. Daily Mail and General Trust pic, [1988]
E.C.R. 5483.
Id., at no. 19.
Judgment of March 9, 1999, Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. V. Ehvers- og Seiskabsstryelsen, [1999]
E.C.R. 1-1459.
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All three decisions seem to concern an old problem of private international law 7 whether the law applicable to a company should be the law of its effective seat (seat
principle) or that of its incorporation (incorporation principle).8 Indeed, academics in
private international law took each of the Court's decisions as deciding this dispute one
way or the other. Daily Mail was understood to mean that member states were essentially
free to apply one principle or the other: 9 The United Kingdom applied the incorporation
principle, but other states were free to apply the seat principle. This interpretation received
a blow by the Centros decision, which suddenly seemed to hold that European law
required member states to accept the incorporation principle. After all, Denmark was
forced to recognize Centros Ltd. as a u.K. company, even though its effective seat was in
Denmark. The Court of Justice was heavily criticized because it had not mentioned the
Daily Mail decision, and had not said directly which of the two private international law
principles should now govern. An underlying criticism was that the Court should refrain
from interfering with private international law altogether. 10
Perhaps, however, there was no need for the Court of Justice to decide these questions at
all, because they did not arise. Axel Flessner argues that both cases were not really private
international law cases at all- the first involved international tax law, the second issues of
registration. 11 This interpretation may look comforting to the discipline of private
international law; it may look untouched. On second view, however, it is even more
threatening. It means that the Court does not use private international law doctrines at all
for questions that are, or were, essentially questions of private international law. If such
fundamental issues like a corporation's personality are now decided under seemingly
autonomous principles of EU law, what room remains for private international law at all?
Where, and how, is it still relevant?
Indeed, in Oberseering the German Bundesgerichtshof as the referring court tried to set
this straight. 12 The court did not restrain itself to asking whether it had to grant
7

8
9
10
11

12

122

Private International Law, or Conflict of Laws, deals with three kinds of question: First is the
question of jurisdiction: Which state's courts are competent to rule on a fact pattern? Second is the
question of choice of law: Which state's law is applicable to a fact pattern? Third is the question of
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and other public acts: Under what circumstances
can such acts passed by another state be recognized and enforced? All three questions are
interrelated, but here the focus shall be only on the second, namely choice of law.
On variants of these principles and on the approaches of different legal systems in Europe see Daniel
Zimmer, Ein internationales Gesellschaftsrecht flir Europa, 67 Rabels Zeitschrift flir ausliindisches
und internationals Privatrecht (RabelsZ) 298-317, 299-306 (2003).
Based on no. 23 of the decision, where the court explicitly acknowledges the differences between the
legal systems of the member states.
For general criticism of the court's approach to private international law see, e. g., Klaus Schurig,
Unilateralistische Tendenzen im europiiischen Gesellschaftskollisionsrecht, oder: Umgehung als
Rechtsprinzip, in Liber amicorum Gerhard Kegel, 199-221 (Munich: Beck, 2002).
Axel Flessner, Schiffbruch der Interpreten und Statuten, 8 Zeitschrift flir Europiiisches Privatrecht
(ZEuP) 1 (2000); see also Harald Halbhuber, Limited Company statt GmbH? Europarechtlicher
Rahmen und deutscher Widerstand (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001); Halbhuber, National doctrinal
structures and European company law, 38 Common Market Law Review (CMLR) 1385-1419
(2001), with an analysis of German comments on Daily Mail and Centros; against Flessner, see
Schurig (supra n. 10) 201 f.: at least registration is an issue of private international law.
Bundesgerichtshof, March 3, 2000, 53 DB 114 (2000); cf. Wulf-Henning Roth, Die Sitzverlegung vor
dem EuGH, 21 Zeitschrift flir Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 1597 (2005).

Uberseering locus standi, but also, more generally, whether European law requires "that a
company's legal capacity and capacity to be a party to legal proceedings [locus standi] is to
be determined according to the law of the State where the company is incorporated". 13 The
Court of Justice decided that this is indeed what European law requires 14 and thereby came
as close to determining the private international law question as conceivable. 15 This
decision could raise mixed feelings in the private international law community. On the one
hand, it makes official that member states have lost the freedom to determine the private
international law principles autonomously - a blow to a discipline that sees conflict of laws
as a matter for the individual states. On the other hand, the court seems at least to
acknowledge that it is dealing with private international law matters, and therefore at least
decides within a familiar doctrinal framework.
Actually, things may not be as easy. Even after Uberseering, Christian Joerges speaks
of the "obsolescence of private international law".16 Arguably, the seat principle would
still be reconcilable with the decision; it would only be restricted by principles of
European law. 17 The problem is that the Court of Justice does not decide questions of
private international law as SUCh.18 Its doctrinal framework, with free movements on the
one hand, and restrictions justified by certain particular concerns of the member states on
the other, does not translate easily into a doctrine of private international law (although
attempts have been made). 19 Even if such a translation is possible, however, it remains
necessarily a translation - the decision-making process itself is not one of private
international law. That discipline must apparently remain in a secondary rank; it can, at
best, re-conceptualize what is decided by other disciplines.

2) Classical Private International Law and Globalization
This development is surprising. Private International Law, one would imagine, should
be better prepared for the challenges posed by Europeanization and globalization than
most any other legal discipline. Laws with impacts beyond territorial borders, while new
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Uberseering (supra n. 1) no. 21.
Uberseering (supra n. 1) no. 93, 95.
Harald Kallmeyer, Tragweite des Uberseeringurteils des EuGH vom 05.11.2002 zur grenziiberschreitenden Sitzverlegung, 55 DB 2521-2522 (2002); Helmut Heiss, "Uberseering": Klarschiff im
internationalen Gesellschaftsrecht?, 44 Zeitschrift fiir Rechtsvergleichung (ZfRV) 90-97, 93-97
(2003).
Christian Joerges, On the Legitimacy of Europeanising Europe's Private Law, 10 (EUI Working Paper
No. 2003/3).
Stefan Leible & Jochen Hoffmann, "Uberseering" und das (vermeintliche) Ende der Sitztheorie, 48
Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 925-936, 930 ff. (2002); Wulf-Henning Roth, Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht nach Uberseering, 23 IPRax 117-127, 126f. (2003).
Schurig (supra n. 11) 200.
See, e. g., Jiirgen Basedow, Der kollisionsrechtliche Gehalt der Produktfreiheiten im europiiischen
Binnenmarkt: favor offerentis, 59 RabelsZ 1-55 (1995); Peter Mankowski, Das Herkunftslandprinzip
als Internationales Privatrecht der e-commerce-Richtlinie, 100 Zeitschrift fiir Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft (ZVgIRWiss) 137-181 (2001); Stefan Grundmann, Das Internationale Privatrecht der
e-commerce-Richtlinie - was ist kategorial anders im Kollisionsrecht des Binnenmarkts und warum?,
67 RabelsZ 246-297 (2003); for an overview, see Ralf Michaels, EU Law as Private International
Law? Reconceptualizing the Country-of-Origin Principle as Vested-Rights Theory, 2 Journal of
Private International Law 147-194, 159-163 (2006) with further references.
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for other legal disciplines, have almost by definition always constituted its main object of
studies. After all, a "conflict of laws" (the discipline's other name)20 is only possible if
more than one legal regulation is, on its face, applicable to a certain fact pattern.
Likewise, the discipline both knew of and dealt with the appearance of "the private" in
the international sphere long before this became an issue of globalization discourse. This is
evidenced in the discipline's other name, Private International Law, coined already in the
19th century by Joseph Story.21 Story's ideal of a largely apolitical common approach to
private law questions, mirrored also in his concept of a far-reaching general common law
transcending state borders, which he developed in the U.S. Supreme Court decision of
Swift v. Tyson,22 still shapes thoughts in the field.
This may be the reason why private international law scholars have not, by and large,
seen the need to adapt the field to the new paradigms of globalization. 23 In this respect, the
field differs remarkably from others. For example, in the field of human rights,
philosophical ideas of universal vs. local values, the interrelatedness of the state's relation
to its citizens on the one hand and to humanity as a whole on the other, now shape much of
the legal discussion. Likewise, intellectual property law is now changing its outlook and
structure, embracing supranational regulations like the TRIPS agreement, transnational
concepts for transactions outside the scope of such supranational solutions,24 and also
solutions to insulate local structures of innovation and cultural production from the threat
of hegemonic commercialization.
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See infra n. 21.
Joseph Story, Conflict of Laws § 9. p. 13 (yd ed., Boston: Little & Brown, and London: Maxwell &
Son, 1846) (The first edition dates from 1834). For Story's influence on Savigny (and thereby on
European conflicts thinking) see Gerhard Kegel, Wohnsitz und Belegenheit bei Story und Savigny, 52
RabelsZ 431 (1988); see also Gerhard Kegel, Story and Savigny, 37 Am. J. Compo L. 39-66 (1989).
Ironically (or perhaps tellingly), while the name "private international law" was imported to Europe
through Foelix and Schaeffner and became dominant (Internationales Privatrecht, Diritto internazionale privato, droit international prive, derecho internacional privado), in the common law world and
most notably in the United States the name is still usually "conflict of laws". See Zitelmann, Der
Name IPR, in 27 Zeitschrift flir internationales Recht 177-196 (1918).
Swift V. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, \0 L.Ed. 865 (1842). This decision was overruled by Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) (arguing, amongst
others, that no law exists without some definite state authority behind it).
Some exceptions: Peter Behrens, Die Bedeutung des Kollisionsrechts flir die "Globalisierung" der
Wirtschaft, in: Aufbruch nach Europa, (J. Basedow et al. eds., Tlibingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001); Pedro
de Miguel Asensio, EI Derecho internacional privado ante la globalizacion, I Anuario Espaiiol de
Derecho Internacional Privado 37-87 (2001); J. C. Gonzales, Globalizacion y Derecho internacional
privado (Murcia, 2002). Admittedly, there is more readiness to accept Europeanization of the field.
See, most recently, M. Wilderspin & X. Lewis, Les relations entre Ie droit communautaire et les
regles de conflits de lois des Etats membres, 91 Revue critique de droit international prive 1-37,
289-313 (2002). Here, a connection between Europeanization and globalization is not usually
established, however, whereas many of the arguments in this paper should be relevant for
globalization as well. See also Ralf Michaels, Welche GlobaJisierung flir das Recht? Welches Recht
flir die Globalisierung?, 69 RabelsZ 525-544 (2005).
See most recently the contributions to the Conference on "International Public Goods and Transfer of
Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime", Duke University School of Law, April
3-5, 2003, http://www.law.duke.edultrips/description.html. now published as International Public
Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (Keith E.
Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).

Few such developments can be seen in the conflict of laws. 25 Sure, many monographs
and articles in the field now invoke, in their introductions, either globalization explicitly, or
some equally vague concepts like "a world growing ever closer together", or a "growing
number of international transactions and situations". From this, their authors draw only the
conclusion that conflict of laws is becoming more important, not that it must change its
structure to account for these developments. Yet the reality looks different. Conflict of
laws, as a discipline, seems to become less and less important. In the European Union, we
see developments towards a Europeanization of conflict of laws. 26 Yet this development
should not conceal the fact that a large part of conflict of laws has already become
Europeanized: a substantive part of the case-law rendered by the Court of Justice in the
area of the freedoms concerns cases that traditionally would have been conflict of laws
cases. On a global level, various international regimes compete with national legal orders,
and amongst each other. 27 Even in Europe, questions of both adjudicatory jurisdiction and
applicable law are often determined rather through the interpretation of statutes and the
determination of their (ominous) "extraterritorial applicability" than through classical
conflict of laws methods. 28 "Classical" scholars of private international law have
surprisingly little to say within these developments; instead, they often propose legal
unification to overcome conflicts,29 and to restrict conflict of laws, as a "second best", to
areas where such unification seems impossible. 30
The discipline's faith in a universal law of mankind, 31 as well as the tendency to try and
avoid clashes of policy, are not accidental. Both are elements stemming from the birth of
classical private international law, as developed in the 19th century by Savigny.32

25
26

27
28
29

30
31

32

Klaus GUnther & Shalini Randeria, Recht, Kultur und Gesellschaft im ProzeB der Globalisierung,
21 f. (Bad Homburg: Werner Reimers Stiftung, 2001).
See, most recently, Erik Jayme & Christian Kohler, Europaisches Kollisionsrecht 2002: Zur
Wiederkehr des Internationalen Privatrechts, 22 IPRax 461-471 (2002); K. Boele-Woelki & R.H.
van Ooik, De ingrijpende communautarisering van het internationaale privaatrecht, 2002 Sociaaleconomische wetgeving (SEW) 394-407 (2002), The Communitarization of Private International
Law, 4 Yearbook of Private International Law 1-36 (2002, published 2003).
On the conflict between such regimes see Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International
Law (Cambridge, 2003).
See Ralf Michaels & Hans-Georg Kamann, Grundlagen eines allgemeinen gemeinschaftlichen
Richtlinienkollisionsrechts - "Amerikanisierung" des Gemeinschafts-IPR?, 12 Europaisches
Wirtschafts- und Sozialrecht (EWS) 301-311, 311 (2001).
Ole Lando, The Eternal Crisis, in Festschrift fUr Ulrich Drobnig, 361-379 (TUbingen: Mohr, 1998);
see also Friedrich K. Juenger, The Problem with Private International Law, in Private Law in the
International Arena - Liber amicorum Kurt Siehr, 289-309 (Jiirgen Basedow et al. eds., The Hague:
Asser, 2000).
See my review of I Yearbook of Private International Law (Sarcevic & Volken, eds., 1999), 48
Netherlands International Law Review (Neth. In!,1 L. Rev.) 108-112, 112 (2001).
For tendencies of private international law towards universalization see Bernard Audit, Le droit
international prive en quete d'universalite - Cours general de droit international prive, 305 Recueil
des cours de I' Academie de La Haye 9-487 (2001, published 2003). The hope for legal unity still
determines traditional comparative law, the sister discipline of private international law. See Ralf
Michaels, 1m Westen nichts Neues?, 66 RabelsZ 97-115,101, 108f. (1998) with further references.
Friedrich Carl von Savigny, 8 System des heutigen Riimischen Rechts (1849), hereinafter VIII
System. English quotations are from the translation by William Guthrie, published as "A Treatise on
the Conflict of Laws" (Edinburgh, 1880).
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Savigny's conception of conflict of laws, after a crisis in the 1960s and 1970s,33 has
returned to being the paradigm of conflict of laws thinking, at least in Europe. 34 Its
neutrality with regard to different legal systems, its assumption of a private law relatively
free of state intervention, seem ideal for a neo-liberal globalization. Furthermore, many
deem the "classical" Savignyan system sufficiently t1exible to account for new developments 35 and see no need for another conflicts revolution.
3) The State as Lens

This hope may be in vain for the following reason. If classical private international law
rests on a state paradigm, and if the role of the state in globalization is no longer the same
as it was in the 19th (and most of the 20th ) century, then the field has lost much of its
foundation. This can only become visible once we make the state the lens through which to
analyze both classical private international law and modern developments. This seems
justified, at least from the viewpoint of globalization. After all, the changing situation of
the state is one important, perhaps the decisive, aspect of globalization. 36 Whether indeed
it loses in importance, whether it gains, or whether it just undergoes a transmutation almost everyone agrees that the state's position in the world is now different from its
position in the 19th century. This should have an impact on private international law, if it is
connected to the state. 37
This paper cannot show that (classical) private international law is inadequate for
globalization. At best, it can show a much more limited claim to be true or at least
probable: that the conception of private international law developed by Savigny in the 19th
century does not hold out to the challenges of globalization. This is a much more modest
argument, but I hope not an irrelevant one. After all, private international law, at least in
continental Europe, is still based to a large degree on ideas of Savigny. Furthermore, while
33
34
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Gerhard Kegel, The 'Crisis' of Conflict of Laws, 112 Recueil des Cours 91-268 (l964-II); see
already Heinrich Kronstein, Crisis of "Conflict of Laws", 37 Geo. L. J. 483 (1949).
Daniel Zimmer, Savigny und das Internationale Privatrecht unserer Zeit, in Festschrift fiir Fritz Sturm
zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, 1709 (1999); see also Mathias Reimann, Savigny's Triumph? Choice of
Law in Contracts Cases at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 39 Virginia Journal of International
Law 571-605 (1999); Paul Volken, How Common are the General Principles of Private International
Law? America and Europe Compared, in I Yearbook of Private International Law 85-102 (1999);
Tito Ballarino & Benedetta Ubertazzi, On Avello and Other Judgements: A New Point of Departure
in the Conflict of Laws?, 6 Yearbook of Private International Law 85, 124--129 (2004).
See, e. g., Jan Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht, 15 (4 th ed., 2001). An early response to the
American conflicts revolution, arguing that evolution of the classical system provides similarly
adequate result, is Bernard Audit, A Continental Lawyer Looks at Contemporary American Choiceof-Law Principles, 27 Am. J. Compo L. 589-613 (1979). For the most comprehensive adaptation of
Savigny's theories, see Klaus Schurig, Kollisionsnorm und Sachrecht (1980).
Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? (1996).
This connection is seldom thematized. But see Eugen Ehrlich, Internationales Privatrecht, 126
Deutsche Rundschau 419-432, 425 (1906); Arthur T. von Mehren, The Significance of the State for
Choice of Law, in Festschrift fiir Konrad Zweigert zum 70. Geburtstag, 287-306 (H. Bernstein et aI.,
eds., 1981); see also Gerhard Kegel & Klaus Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht (8th ed., Munich:
Beck), 7-22 (2000). See now Ralf Michaels, The Re-State-Ment of Non-State Law: The State,
Choice of Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 Wayne Law Review 1209-1259
(2005).

there are several studies on Savigny's conception of private international law, 38 the role of
the state in it has not yet been analyzed with regard to globalization.
One may argue that today's private international law looks very different from that of
Savigny. This is certainly the case. My claim is only that certain essential elements still
exist more or less in the way that they underlie Savigny's conception, and that these
elements are connected to the State and become problematic in globalization. Further
developments within the theory are then not decisive for the argument (although this can,
of course, only be assumed here). Because the conception is established in the 19th century,
it is there that we have to look for the paradigms that still, if secretly, shape the discipline.
Another possible criticism is that even in the 19th century Savigny is not the only
important figure in private international law, that at least two other writers must be
mentioned: Joseph Story and Pasquale Stanislao Mancini. 39 Again, the criticism would be
valid. Yet it may be justified to focus only on Savigny, at least for now. Both for Story's and
Mancini's conceptions, the role of the state is evident. Story bases his private international
law on comity between states,40 Mancini bases his on nationality and sovereignty,41 both
see the discipline as part of international law. The role of the state in Savigny's conception
is much less obvious. If it can be shown that even for Savigny the state is not only relevant
but predominant, we can be relatively sure that the state permeates private international
law thinking in the 19th century altogether. With these caveats, the analysis can begin.

II. The State in Savigny's Private Interational Law
The State has found various different forms in history,42 and these various forms have
been relevant for conceptions of the conflict of laws in different times. The nation state is
relatively recent and may be of fleeting importance. 43 When we look at Savigny's
conception of the conflict of laws, we must be aware that he writes before the advent in
Germany, and as an opponent of, the modem "nation state".
38

39
40
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43

Most recently, Jean-Louis Halperin, Entre nationalisme juridique et communaute de droit, 47-66
(Paris, 1999); Ulrike Seif, Savigny und das Internationale Privatrecht des 19. Jahrhunderts, 65
RabelsZ 492-512 (2001). Earlier studies include Max Gutzwiller, Der EinfluB Savignys auf die
Entwicklung des Internationalprivatrechts (Fribourg 1923); Fritz Sturm, Savigny und das internationale Privatrecht seiner Zeit, 8 Ius commune 92- 109 (1979); Sakurada, Wirkungsbereich und
Funktion des Kollisionsrechts - Einige Gedanken iiber Savignys IPR, in: Internationales Privatrecht. internationa1es Wirtschaftsrecht, 127-144 (Holl & Klinke eds., 1985).
Max Gutzwiller, Internationalprivatrecht: Die drei GroBen des 19. Jahrhunderts, in: Festschrift fiir
Frank Vischer zum 60. Geburtstag, 131-140 (Peter Bockli et al. eds., Zurich: Schulthess, 1983).
Story (supra n. 21) §§ 33-38, pp. 43-49.
Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, Della nazionalita come fondamento del diritto delle genti (E. Jayme, ed.,
Torino: Giappichelli, 1994); Mancini, De l'utilite de rendre obligatoires pour tous les Etats, sous la
forme d'un ou de plusieurs traites internationaux, un certain nombre de regles generales du Droit
international prive pour assurer la decision uniforme des conflits entre les differentes legislations
civiles et criminelles, I Journal du droit international prive (Clunet) 221 (1874); see Halperin (supra
n. 38) 67-85.
See Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (1999).
Michael Stolleis, Was kommt nach dem souveriinen Nationalstaat? Und was kann die Rechtsgeschichte dazu sagen?, in European and International Regulation after the Nation State. Different
Scopes and Multiple Levels 17-30 (Adrienne Heritier, Michael Stolleis & Fritz W. Scharpf eds.,
2004); Jost Delbriick, Das Staatsbild im Zeitalter wirtschaftsrechtlicher Globa1isierung (2002).
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Nevertheless it should be safe to start with the classical definition of the state rendered
by the German tradition of "Allgemeine Staatslehre", as developed by Georg lellinek: 44
The state is the organisation of sedentary people which has .original sovereign power. 45
Here, the state is defined by three elements: a territory, a population, and state power
which I will here translate as (internal) sovereignty.46 What remains to be shown is that
both the state in general and all three of its elements can be found in, and influence,
Savigny's private international law.
1) The Role of the State for Private Law
Fleeting knowledge of Savigny and his theory of law as born from the people's spirit
(Volksgeist) might lead one to believe that for him law, at least private law, exists outside the
state. Savigny would then be the perfect idol for a "global law without a state", as is
proposed for globalization. 47 It is well known that Savigny is an opponent of codification, 48
and that, although he approves of the primacy of legislation over customary and scientific
law,49 he does not think highly of state legislation in the area of private law in general. Yet it
would be a fundamental misunderstanding to think that Savigny's conception of (private)
law was independent of the state. 50 Granted, Savigny argues that law emanates from the
people, so neither state nor jurists seem necessary. Nevertheless, there are two important
connections between state and private law in Savigny's thinking.
The first one may appear obvious: the state enforces the law, through civil procedure
and criminal law, including criminal procedure. Savigny calls this the "first and irrefutable
task of the state, to make the idea of law govern in the visible world". 51 Yet these areas of
the law are public law (offentliches Recht) and thus distinct from private law. Savigny's
private law exists independent of its enforcement in the courts, and is therefore not. as it
often is in the common law world, part of civil procedure.
44
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Georg lellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre 394-434. (3 th ed., Berlin: Springer, 1914); see most recently
Jens Kersten, Georg Jellinek und die klassische Staatslehre (2000).
"Der Staat ist die mit urspriinglicher Herrschermacht ausgeriistete Verbandseinheit sesshafter
Menschen". Jellinek (supra n. 44) p. 180f.
Staatsgebiet, Staatsvolk, Staatsgewalt. See, e. g., Josef Isensee, Staat und Verfassung, in: I Handbuch
des Staatsrechts, § 13, no. 28 ff. (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., Heidelberg: C. F. Muller 1987).
Sovereignty is one important part of state power for lellinek: Jellinek (supra n. 44), 435-489.
Global Law Without a State (Gunther Teubner ed., Aldershot et aI., 1997).
See his classical work "Vom Beruf unserer Zeit fur Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (1814,
reprint in Thibaut und Savigny - Ihre programmatischen Schriften, 95-192 (H. Hattenhauer. ed.,
1973); English translation: The vocation of our age for Legislation and Jurisprudence, translated from
the German of Frederick Charles von Savigny by Abraham Hayward, 2nd ed., London: Littlewood &
Co., 1831); see also Politik und neuere Legislationen - Materialien zum "Geist der Gesetzgebung"
(H. Akamatsu & J. Ruckert, eds., 2000).
See Savigny, I System des heutigen Romischen Rechts (1840), § 13 (pp. 38-44) (hereafter I System).
As is apparently assumed by Christian Joerges, Zum Funktionswandel des Kollisionsrechts, 6 (1971);
Seif (supra n. 38) 501: law as organic expression of the people, not part of the state order ("organische
LebensauBerung des Volkes und nicht Bestandteil der staatlichen Ordnung"); already KJaus Vogel,
Der raumliche Anwendungsbereich der Verwaltungsrechtsnorm, 215 ff. (FrankfurtlM. & Berlin,
1965). For Savigny, this antagonism of people and state does not exist, because his conception of the
state is different.
Savigny, I System § 9, pp. 25-27; Dieter Strauch, Recht, Gesetz und Staat bei Friedrich Carl von
Savigny, 100 (2 nd ed., Bonn 1963 J.

This connection between state and private law becomes relevant, however, in a more
general sense, and this is the second connection. Savigny does not distinguish between
state as government and as people, as Anglo-American theories would do. Quite to the
contrary, he argues explicitly that every people appears as state. 52 Consequently, a state of
nature - where there is private law without a state - is inconceivable, 53 and "private
legislation,,54 (or even private codification 55), in particular private contracts, do not
become law 56 (unlike the famous Art. 1134 of the French Code Civil 57). Put simply, just as
the people only attain reality through the state, the people's (private) law becomes law only
through the state as well. 58 Savigny's political conservatism prevents him from embracing
ideas of a quasi-spontaneous privately formed law.
Thus, private law is always state law. However, Savigny's state is not a government
separate from the people, with discretion to legislate as the ruler pleases. Instead, because
Savigny sees the state as the organizing form of the people, consequently legislation
emanates from, and therefore reflects, both customary and scientific law. What Savigny
rejects is not the idea of private law as state law, but of private law based on a ruler's
discretion, on politics. 59 Politics can be left to public law - an area of the law that Savigny
distinguishes sharply from private law. Public law is political (and therefore unscientific
and comparably uninteresting from a scientific point of view),60 private law is scientific
and in this sense apolitical, pure. 61
52
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Savigny, I System § 9, p. 23: "Vielmehr wird jedes Volk, sobald es als solches erscheint, zugleich als
Staat erscheinen, wie auch dieser gestaltet seyn mdge.", § 10, p. 29: "miissen wir wiederholt
behaupten, daB der Staat urspriinglich und naturgemaB in einem Volk, durch das Volk, und fur das
Volk entsteht." (emphases in original). See already Savigny, Juristische Methodenlehre - nach der
Ausarbeitung des Jakob Grimm, 14 (Wesenberg, ed., 1951); cf. Strauch (supra n. 51) 20-22, 98.
Okko Behrends, Geschichte, Politik und Jurisprudenz in F. C. v. Savignys System des heutigen
rdmischen Rechts, in Rdmisches Recht in der europaischen Tradition - Symposion aus AnlaB des 75.
Geburtstages von Franz Wieacker, 257-321, 266ff. (Behrends et al. eds., Ebelsbach: Gremer, 1985).
Ferdinand Kirchhof, Private Rechtsetzung (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1987); Global Law Without
a State (supra n. 47).
Catherine Kessedjian, La codification privee, in E Pluribus Unum - Liber amicorum Georges A. L.
Droz, 135-149 (1996); Ralf Michaels, Privatautonomie und Privatkodifikation, 62 RabelsZ 580-626
(1998).
Savigny, I System § 6, p. 12. For the question of contract as a source of law in Roman law see Zoltan
Yegh, Ex pacto ius - Studien zum Vertrag als Rechtsquelle bei den Rhetoren, 11 0 Zeitschrift fiir
Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung (SavZlRom), 184-295 (1993). Savigny was also
opposed to social contract theories of the state, see Savigny, I System § 10, p. 29.
"Les conventions legalement fonnees tiennent lieu de loi 11 ceux qui les ont faits."
Savigny, I System § 9.
Savigny, Vom Beruf (supra n. 48) 16 (Thibaut und Savigny, 106); Savigny, Ober den Zweck dieser
Zeitschrift [Zeitschrift flir geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaftl; in Thibaut und Savigny (supra n. 48)
261-268, 264.
See Joachim RUckert, Idealismus, Jurisprudenz und Politik bei Friedrich Carl von Savigny, 397-399
(Ebelsbach: Verlag Rolf Gremer 1984); Olivier Beaud, Savigny et Ie droit public. Plaidoyer pour une
lecture politique de l'reuvre de Savigny, in Recht zwischen Natur und Geschichte, 193-205 (Ius
Commune Sonderheft 100, Kervegan & Mohnhaupt eds., 1997). For connections between the
historical school and public law, see Michael Stolleis, Die historische Schule und das Offentliche
Recht, in Die Bedeutung der Wdrter - Studien zur europaischen Rechtsgeschichte, Festschrift flir Sten
Gagner, 495-508 (Stolleis ed., 1991). See also Claudio Cesa, Sulle idee politiche della scuola storica,
16 Annali della Scuola Nonnale Superiore di Pisa: Classe di Lettere e Filosofia, 83-106 (1986).
See Joachim Riickert, The Unrecognized Legacy: Savigny's Influence on Gennan Jurisprudence after
1900,37 Am. J. Compo L. 121-137, 136 (1989); Riickert, Savignys Konzeption von Jurisprudenz und
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Thus we find that the state plays a central role for Savigny's conception of all law,
including private law. This central role is quintessential for the development of classical
private international law as well. By transcending the distinction between people and
state,62 Savigny makes it possible to think of private law as the emanation of the people's
spirit, and still conceptualize private international law as a system of conflicts between
state laws. On the one hand, the state enforces laws (domestic or foreign) with its
institutions, namely the judge. On the other side of the equation, the sovereign state also
defines, and limits, the "law" to be chosen by choice of law, the applicable law. The
classical choice-of-law process always directs the state judge to apply state law. 63 Thus,
the state is present both as enforcer, and as creator of enforceable law, as subject and object
of the choice-of-law process.

2) Sovereignty
Thus, the state is indeed central to Savigny's private international law. How do
JelIinek's three elements 64 fare? The first element of interest is sovereignty. Sovereignty
is, of course, quintessential for theories of private international law as part of international
law. Thus, before Savigny, Joseph Story devotes passages of his treatise to comity as a way
to overcome concerns of sovereignty. After Savigny, Mancini sees sovereignty as one
building block of private international law. Yet both consider private international law as
international law, so the importance of sovereignty is not surprising. How does sovereignty
figure in Savigny's concept of private international law? Is not sovereignty reserved to
questions of public law (and politics)?
Generally, the question appears in private international law as perhaps its primordial
problem: Why should a judge ever apply foreign law? Why should he, if his own law and
foreign law provide different rules for the situation at hand, prefer the foreign law to his
own? From a practical point of view, there may be several reasons - predictability and
uniformity of results, party expectations, all these are considerations favoring such
application. Also, if a legislator directs the judge to apply foreign law, positive law
solves the question. 65 Yet legislation is rare at Savigny's time (and still incomplete today).
Moreover, this positivistic recourse to the legislature does not answer the prior philosophical/ political problem involved in submitting to foreign law, both as a question outside
legislation, and as a question for the legislator.
At least three ideas have been conceived to justify such a submission. 66 First, one might
want to circumvent the problem by arguing that the judge does not really apply foreign law
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Recht, ihre Folgen und ihre Bedeutung bis heute, 61 Tijdschrift voor rechtsgeschiedenis 65-95, 82 f.
(1993).
For this aspect see particularly Riickert (supra n. 60) 312-328.
Gerhard Kegel & Klaus Schurig (supra n. 37) 16; Rest. (2d) Conflict of Laws § 1 (1971); Michaels
(supra n. 37) 1228-1231.
Supra n, 44.
Savigny, VIII System 26, 130.
The third solution is the fiction that the judge applies a new ad hoc rule of his own law, modeled after
that of the foreign legal system. This solution, disregarded by Savigny, has been favored both in the
United States as "local law theory", and in Italy as "incorporation theory", For the U.S. see Guinness

at all (and therefore does not submit to the foreign sovereign). This solution materializes in
the 19th century theory of vested rights ("wohlerworbene Rechte",67 "droits acquis,,68). As
Dicey, one of its most important later propagators, writes: "[T]he courts, e. g. of England,
never in strictness enforce foreign law; when they are said to do so, they enforce not
foreign laws, but rights acquired under foreign laws.,,69 The theory gains even more
popularity in the United States, where it enters into the Restatement through its propagator
Beale 70 _ before being debunked by legal realism. 71 In Europe, this debunking has already
taken place when Savigny writes his 1849 treatise on private international law. In 1841142,
Carl Georg von Wachter has rejected the theory on two grounds. First it is circular: the
judge cannot determine whether a right has been acquired under a foreign law without
applying that foreign law; yet whether that law is applicable is exactly what the process
should establish. Second, the argument is inconclusive: only the state that has granted a
right can be held obliged to enforce it; that state cannot impose an obligation on other
states to enforce rights "vested" under its law.72 Savigny approves. 73
The second theory to avoid a clash between sovereigns is the theory of comitas (Voet,
Huber), comity (Dicey, Story), or courtoisie (Foelix, Vareilles-Sommieres) 74. Under this
theory, sovereigns enforce each other's laws on the basis of courtesy. This is less than an
obligation (thus there is no submission), but more than mere discretion,75 a very vague
concept somewhere between law and politics / international relations. The problem with
the concept is, of course, that it only explains why, in certain situations, sovereigns may
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v. Miller, 291 Fed. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), aff'd, 299 Fed. 538 (2d Cir. 1924), aff'd sub nom. Hicks v.
Guinness, 269 U.S. 71 (1925) perJ. Hand; Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the
Conflict of Laws, 29 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press 1942); cf. David F. Cavers, The Two
"Local Law" Theories, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 822-832 (1950), reprinted in Cavers, The Choice-of-Law
Process, 45-55 (1985). For Italy see Bernardini, Produzione di norme giuridiche mediante rinvio
(Milan, 1966).
Horst Muller, Der Grundsatz des wohlerworbenen Rechts im internationalen Privatrecht (Hamburg,
1935); Max Keller & Kurt Siehr, Allgemeine Lehren des internationalen Privatrechts (Zurich:
Schulthess, 1986), 418-426; for criticism see Jan Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht, § 21.1,
pp. 141-144 (4 th ed., 2001).
Antoine Pillet, La tMorie generale des droits acquis, 8 Recuei1 des Cours 485-538 (I925-I1I).
Albert Venn Dicey, A Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws, 11 (2 nd
ed. 1908).
Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934); Joseph Beale, Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935); see
also Soater v. Mexican National Railroad Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) per J. Holmes.
For an attempted revival, see Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness", and Choice of Law, 96 Yale L.
J. 1191-1275 (1987) with further references.
Carl Georg von Wachter, Ueber die Collision der Privatrechtsgesetze verschiedener Staaten
(Fortsetzung), 25 Archiv fUr die civilistische Praxis (AcP) 1-9 (1842). On Wachter, see Kurt H.
Nade1mann, Wachter's Essay on the Collision of Private Laws of Different States, 13 Am. J. Compo
L. 414-428 (1964); Nikolaus Sandmann, Grund1agen und Enfluss der internationa1privatrechtlichen
Lehre Carl Georg von Wachters (1797-1880) (Diss. Munster, 1979); see also Paul Vo1ken, Wenn
Wachter mit Story, in Private Law in the International Arena (supra n. 29) 815-828.
Savigny, I System § 361, p. 132.
For actual relevance see Lawrence Collins, Comity in Modem Private International Law, in: Reform
and Development of Private International Law - Essays in Honour of Sir Peter North 89-110 (James
Fawcett ed., Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002).
But see Alan Watson, Joseph Story and the Comity of Errors (Athens and London: Univ. of Georgia
Press, 1992) (arguing that Huber had stated a duty to apply foreign law, and that Story, in invoking a
degree of discretion, had misunderstood him).
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agree to enforce foreign laws, but does not give any guidelines or principles when this is, or
should be, done.
Savigny accepts this concept of comity 76 but changes it dramatically. On the one hand,
he establishes comity as a duty to apply foreign laws. 77 On the other hand, he denies that
any submission of one sovereign to the other is necessary. Indeed, he does not see choice of
law as a problem of sovereignty at all. 78 The reason must be seen in his conception of
private law. Differences between the private laws of states are a fact of the European state
of things in the 19th century. Yet they are not, in Savigny's mind, based on clashes of
politics 79 or sovereigns, but on an imperfect state of development, and they can be
overcome over time. Thus, the conflict of laws is no real conflict for Savigny, because the
ground for differences was not different political opinions. By privatizing conflict of laws,
Savigny avoids the possibility of a clash. 80
The reason for the lack of a clash is only partly the apolitical character of private law.
Another important factor is Savigny's conviction that all Christian nations (and these are
the only ones he is interested in) ultimately share the same underlying values in their
private laws. 81 Thus, even if private law is not value-free, a conflict of laws between
Christian nations is still not a conflict between different values, because Christianity serves
as an overarching framework within which conflicts take place.
This "privatization" of choice of law can also be seen in Savigny's method. Instead of
determining the territorial scope of statutes, Savigny seeks for the "seat" of a "legal
relation" in order to determine the law applicable to it. This has famously been called a
"Copernican Revolution" Ckopernikanische Wende,,).82 Logically, the difference is one
of starting point only, not of result: Whether one determines the scope of a statute and then
finds which relations fit under it, or whether one starts with the relation and determines the
applicable statute, should make no difference in outcome. Savigny was well aware of this
himself. 83 Yet there is a difference. Partly it is (merely) psychological. 84 By starting with
the legal relation, Savigny is able to assert an argumentative primacy of this relation over
the applicable law. It is not the lawmaker who decides what situations he wants to cover, it
is the situation which determines the appropriate lawmaker. Starting with the statute and
its scope of application has a political, public overtone; starting with the legal relation
emphasizes the private, apolitical character of the choice-of-Iaw process. Actually,
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Savigny, VIII System § 348, p. 28: "freundliche Zulassung".
Ibid.
Savigny, VIII System § 348, p. 25; see also Seif (supra n. 38) 509.
Paul Neuhaus, Savigny und die Rechtsfindung aus der Natur der Sache, IS RabelsZ 364, 376 (1949/
50).
Savigny's depoliticization of choice of law has been emphasized frequently; see only critically J. E. 1.
Th. Deelen, De blinddoek van von Savigny (Amsterdam, 1966); Hans Ulrich Jessurun d'Oliveira, De
ruine van een paradigma: de konfliktregel (Deventer, 1976); Joerges (supra n. 50), 9 f.
Savigny, VIII System § 346, p. 17. Story had already distinguished Christian from heathen laws:
Story (supra n. 21) § 25, p. 36.
Neuhaus (supra n. 79) 366 (1949/50).
Savigny, I System § 344, pp. 1-3; cf. Schurig (supra n. 35) 115 f.
Kegel & Schurig (supra n. 37) 165 f., with a slightly different emphasis.

however, the difference is not only psychological. 85 By looking at the (potential) scope of
application of a statute, it is possible that more than one statute claims applicability - a true
conflict in the jargon of governmental interest analysis. 86 If we start with the legal relation,
such a true conflict is impossible: a legal relation has only one seat, and this seat
determines the applicable law. Conflicts are made impossible.
Consequently, this apolitical conception of choice of law is appropriate only for private
law in a narrow sense. Savigny himself proposes a different treatment for "laws, whose
peculiar nature does not admit of so free an application of the community of law obtaining
between different states".87 He distinguishes two kinds of such laws: first "laws of a
strictly positive, imperative nature", and second, "legal institutions of a foreign state, of
which the existence is not at all recognized in ours, and which, therefore, have no claim to
the protection of our courts".88 In modem terminology, these are internationally
mandatory rules and the public policy exception. Here, sovereignty does playa role:
the legislator's will is decisive. 89 Savigny acknowledges a political choice-of-Iaw system
with the possibility of clashing sovereignties, and it may be due to the relative brevity of
his article devoted to the question that this aspect has become only an exception, an
afterthought to classical choice of law. 90
In one sense, therefore, it Savigny's concept of private international law may seem less
closely linked to state sovereignty - and thus more apt for globalization - than that of other
authors. If private law is essentially value-neutral (at least vis-a-vis other Christian states),
then there seems to be no need to restrict private international law to state laws, linked with
a sovereign. It seems possible to apply non-state laws, chosen according to non-state
criteria, as well. Yet such a concept would no longer be in accordance with Savigny's
concept because of his emphasis on a necessary connection between law and state. As a
matter of fact, this necessary connection makes the state particularly important for his
approach. Others may distinguish between sovereign-related private laws, where conflicts
must be solved by comity or some other means, and other private laws, where the state can
be left behind. For Savigny, this second category of laws simply does not exist.

3) Territory
The second element of the state - territory - has perhaps become even more important
than the first. Savigny is not, of course, the first to introduce territory into private
international law. Almost since the birth of the discipline, there has been a growing tension
between the older principle of personality and the younger one of territoriality. In the middle
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See also Paul Heinrich Neuhaus, Abschied von Savigny?, 46 RabelsZ 1-25, 8 f. (1982).
See Eugene F. Scoles, Peter Hay et aI., Conflict of Laws § 2.9, pp. 25-38 (3rd ed., St. Paul, West,
2000).
Savigny, VIII System § 349, p. 32.
Id. at § 349, p. 33.
Id. at § 349, p. 34 f.
In a sense, both the governmental interest analysis in the United States and the "political school" of
choice of law in Germany only reverse the rule-exception relation: for them, the political aspect
becomes the rule, the apolitical one the exception.
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ages, the applicable law was that of the individual's clan, a personal criterion. Territoriality
arises, as the factor to detennine the applicable law, with the rise of the territorial state. As
such, however, it is closely connected to questions of sovereignty - because sovereignty is
territorial, so is the scope of jurisdiction, the reach of the sovereign's will.
In the light of this close connection between sovereignty (over territory) and
territoriality, it is interesting to note that Savigny, while otherwise rather opposed to
sovereignty as basis for private international law, not only maintains, but even enhances
the territorial aspect. For him, the conflict of laws is not a conflict of sovereigns over
territories, but still a conflict of territorial laws. 91 His relevant criterion to determine the
applicable law is the "seat" ("Sitz"),92 the "home" ("Heimath,,)93 of a legal relation. This
is evidently a territorial quality of this relation, making it necessary to place it in a
physical, territorial location.
The seat may not be a purely territorial concept,94 at least not in a purely factual sense.
Savigny is eager to distinguish his approach not only from the theory of vested rights with
its territorial idea that rights "vest" in a territory before their bearer travels. 95 He also
criticizes an earlier Gennan author, Wilhelm Peter Schaeffner, although Schaeffner also
emphasizes the legal relations as the starting point, trying to determine "where it came into
existence".96 The difference is not easy to spot. 97 In all likelihood, Savigny is critical of
Schaeffner's apparent emphasis on a merely factual geographical determination. Apparently, Savigny's conception of "seat" (just as that of Besitz, possession),98 is not merely
factual, but a combination of factual (geographical) and ideal/legal elements.
Nevertheless, as a consequence of the emphasis of the "seat", Savigny's choice-of-law
rules for particular legal relations are entirely territorial in nature. He sees four relevant
elements: 99 domicile, place of a thing, place of an act, place of the court. All four elements
are territorial in nature. Consequently, it is not surprising that Savigny's particular choiceof-law rules are territorial as well. Personal status is determined by domicile (§§ 362365), the same is true for the law of succession (§§ 379-380) and matrimonial questions;
here, the husband's domicile is decisive (§ 379-380). The law of things is determined by
the location of the things (for movable and immovable property alike) (§§ 366-368). The
law of contract depends on a territorial connection as well: the place of perfonnance
(§ 370). Discarded is another possible territorial connection, the place of execution; it
remains relevant for fonnal requirements of juridical acts (§ 381).
91
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Savigny, VIII System § 346, p. 18, defines the relevant question as: "What territorial law is
applicable in any given case?" (emphasis in original).
VIII System § 360, p. 108; see already § 348, p. 28.
Id. at § 360, p. 108, § 361, p. 120.
Max Gutzwiller, Der EinfluB Savignys auf die Entwicklung des Intemationalprivatrechts (1923); Leo
Raape & Fritz Sturm, I Intemationales Privatrecht 410 (Munich: Vahlen, 1977).
Supra, p. 131.
Wilhelm Peter Schaeffner, Entwicklung des intemationalen Privatrechts, 40 (1841). On Schaeffner
see Stefan Wagner, Wilhelm Peter Schaeffner, 17 Praxis des Intemationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 73-76 (1997).
Kegel (supra n. 21) 61 is "taken aback" by Savigny's criticism of Schaeffner.
Savignv, Das Recht des Besitzes. Eine civilistische Abhandlung 22 (GieBen: Heyer 1803).
Savigny, VIII System, § 361, p. 120f.

Most of these results are not new compared to those of older theories. lOo Savigny
emphasizes territory over personality more than others before him, but he remains within
the old territoriality / personality dichotomy. Nevertheless, the change he brings about in
the starting point of the analysis - the legal relation - places these traditional results on a
whole new basis. Under the old statute theory, the territoriality principle has been a direct
function of the territorial boundaries of sovereignty. The sovereign power extended only to
the state's boundaries; hence the state's laws have a territorially limited scope of
application. Savigny's conception of legal relations, because it does not rely on the basis
of such power, could, in theory, allow for non-territorial factors to determine the applicable
law as well - provided that law could be thought as non-territorial. Yet ultimately it
appears that Savigny uses territorial factors because law is still territorial for him. The
law's territoriality comes not from the sovereign's limited power but from the territoriality
of the people as the source of private law. 101 This territoriality of law is nowhere really
justified (at least not in Vol. VIII of the System) but rather assumed; yet that only makes it
more relevant for Savigny's private international law.
4) Citizenship
Territoriality does not become the predominant principle for the conflict of laws
without an argument. In fact, Savigny devotes a lengthy passage to the distinction between
origo and domicilium, or origin (a personal concept) and domicile (a territorial
concept).102 The relative length of this passage may seem surprising.103 One possible
explanation is rather trivial: the American Joseph Story, in his work on the conflict of laws
that will be so influential on Savigny,104 starts with the definition of domicile. 105 Yet there
is also a political background to Savigny's need to explain, at length, his preference of
territoriality over citizenship. The personality principle was originally, in pre-modem
times, a tribal concept; 106 as such, it is outdated for Savigny's time and easy to discard. Yet
the personality principle has been reinvented, so to speak, as the principle of nationality,
together with the birth of the nation state. Art. 3 (3) of the new French Code Civil provides:
"The laws relating to the condition and privileges of persons govern Frenchmen, although
residing in a foreign country." 107 Here, the connecting factor is a personal one, namely
100
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(1988).
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Kegel (supra n. 21).
Story (supra n. 21), ch. 3, pp. 50ff.
Savigny himself wrote about the medieval principle; see his Geschichte des romischen Rechts im
Mittelalter, 115 ff. (2nd ed., 1834). See, more recently, Simeon L. Guterman, The Principle of the
Personality of Law in the Early Middle Ages: A Chapter in the Evolution of Western Legal
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nationality. Savigny thinks the principle itself mostly irrelevant in practice 108 - an
evaluation which is hardly true even in his time. More importantly, the underlying idea
of nationality must be anathema to his political thinking, just as the nation state was, and
potentially dangerous. Savigny does see the attractiveness of nationality. He considers the
possibility of limiting domicile to conflicts of laws within a state, and adopting nationality
for conflicts between different states, but rejects nationality as a connecting factor here as
well. 109 It is only Mancini in Italy, somewhat later, who introduces the principle of
nationality as one of the three determining factors for private international law 110 (the
other two being party autonomy 111 and sovereign state interests) and makes it so popular
that the German legislator, who is otherwise thought to have followed Savigny in many
respects,112 adopts nationality over domicile as the connecting factor for personal
issues. 113
The connection between a principle of nationality and the (nation) state is easier to see
than that between Savigny's concept of domicile and the state. Nevertheless, such a
connection exists. Savigny's rejection of nationality as connecting factor reflects a
rejection of the nation state, not of the state as such. A valuable insight comes from
Savigny's conception of the citizen. 114 This conception is less political than a concept of
nationality. In fact, in his treatise on private international law, he admits that domicile (as
the determining factor) is more accidental, and more open to manipulation by the
individual, than other criteria. liS Nevertheless, citizenship is what defines the individ108
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ual's membership with the people. Since, in tum, the people has its reality in the state,
citizenship, mediated through the people, connects the individual with the law of a
particular state. Savigny says so explicitly. 116 Thus, citizenship (as a factor of the state)
does playa role for Savigny's private international law, and it is connected to the state.
With regard to private international law, Savigny's concept of citizenship collapses into
a territorial concept, namely domicile. Savigny considers nationality less relevant for two
reasons, and both are interesting from a view of globalization. The first indeed sounds
strikingly modem and global: the increasing commerce between the peoples makes
differences between nationalities less harsh and less relevant. 117 Yet there is a second,
somewhat more startling reason: "The influence of Christianity ... as a common bond of
spiritual life embracing the most diverse nations, has thrown their characteristic
differences more and more into the background.,,118 This means that Savigny's system
of private international law is really made only for Christian nations, and excludes nonChristians, especially Jews. 119 Savigny's relation to the Jews has been the object of several
studies 120 and is not of interest here as such. What is relevant is the somewhat paradoxical
result that Savigny's concept of domicile makes different treatment of Jews within the
applicable territorial law possible. A nationality principle in the sense of the modern nation
states would, normally, emancipate the Jews and thereby treat them like other nationals as happened in France in 1791.121 A different interpersonal private international law could
treat the Jews as a different nation and apply their own laws to them. While Savigny does
apparently consider such a treatment of the Christian church as independent from the
state, 122 the Jews do not benefit from such treatment. Under Savigny's territorial approach,
if Prussian law is applicable, this includes the special discriminatory provisions for
Jews. 123 His private international law remains a conflict between state laws, with no place
for non-state law. Before private international law, personal alliance is to a state only.
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III. Savigny's System in Globalization
Summing up the previous section, the state is visible in Savigny's concept of private
international law in various ways. The state is relevant insofar as all private law is state law,
and the state has the task to enforce private law. Sovereignty is largely irrelevant: the
conflict of laws is not a real conflict, because the differences between private laws do not
reflect clashes of politics; private international law is, in this sense, purely private and
apolitical. Territory is of primary importance, because private international law answers
differences between territorial laws; consequently the method of private international law
is to determine the territorial "seat" of a legal relation, and to apply the (territorial) law in
force at that place. Finally, citizenship is determined, for private international law
purposes, through a territorial factor (domicile).
We can safely say that these four principles are still, by and large, valid in private
international law. However, all of them are somewhat problematic in globalization. One
reason may well be that the underlying conception of the state is no longer adequate.
Jellinek's definition of the state as "organization of sedentary people which has original
sovereign power" 124 turns out to be inadequate in all of its three elements.
First, people are no longer sedentary. We witness an enormous increase of mobility,
partly due to easier modes of transportation, partly through public encouragement ("free
movement of persons" 125). The state population becomes more hybrid. Second, and for
somewhat similar reasons, the state territory loses importance - not because it is harder to
define, but because, in times of transportation and internet, it becomes less relevant.
Finally, sovereignty becomes relative, not only with regard to other sovereign states, butmore importantly - with regard to other powerful actors, especially supranational
organizations, but also private actors like NGOs and multinational corporations.
These changes effect private international law as well. Some aspects shall just be
mentioned. For example, not all law is state law anymore. We see a rise both of
supranational law - the European Union being the prime example - and of non-national
law, private norm creation. 126 Choice-of-Iaw rules could, theoretically, point to all kinds of
rules, including non-state rules, 127 but mostly they do not. 128 At the same time, not all
decision makers are state institutions. For example, arbitrators face choice-of-Iaw
questions as well. 129 Nevertheless, the sovereign state, both as deciding institution (the
judge) and as provider of applicable rules, still shapes the discipline's character.
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Furthermore, Savigny's dream of a convergence of laws under the bond of Christianity
has not come true - not only because non-Christian nations have become more numerous
and important, but also because Christian nations do not, of course, agree on relevant
issues. This leads to clashes because Savigny's conception of an apolitical private law has
proved to be an illusion in the 20th century. In fact, Savigny's apolitical character of private
international law is the one element that came under severe criticism early on. Now we
seem to be watching a tendency back from a politicized private international law. However,
this is not a step back to the situation Savigny faced. Savigny's legal system contained
clearly delimited public and private law spheres within the sovereign state. This state was
strong in the public sphere, and (deliberately) weak in the private sphere. The political
school of private international law urged the state to be strong in the private sphere as well.
This step, radical as it looked, really only meant replacing one state element (territoriality)
with another (state interests, sovereignty). In other words, the private international law
process still took place within, and from, the state paradigm. The situation in globalization
is different: the state is weak again in the private sphere (and beyond), partly from
deliberation, partly from the pressure of globalization. The privatization of international
relations, the competition of legal orders - all these are factors that disable the state and
make its restrictions in the realm of private law more a function of necessity.
Also, determining a territorial seat becomes difficult in globalization, because
territoriality has lost much of its meaning. 130 This is due not only to the fact that the
state's power almost regularly extends "extraterritorially" - the Iraq war as a quasipolicing project is only the latest, and most obvious, example. Even irrespective of the
state, territory is difficult to grasp: in the "global village", borders lose significance,
distances become irrelevant, markets transcend national boundaries, virtual spaces (like
the internet) come into existence. Private international law can deal with this development
in the sense that it will always be possible to determine certain territorial connections, but
it may become questionable whether those connections actually make sense anymore.
Finally, the personal element is still in dispute. Whether nationality or domicile should
govern questions of the person is still an open question. 131 Yet the question may be too
narrow, because it is still connected to state determinants. In a post-national age, peoples'
identities may have to be determined by more than just their nationality or their domicile,
and a more adequate private international law might want to take these additional factors
into account.
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IV. The Statute of Corporations and the Uberseering Decision
All of these points cannot be proven here. What can be done is to show how they
influence the Ubersee decision presented in the introduction, and how these changes may
explain the mentioned "obsolescence of traditional private international law".

1) The role of the state
The role of the state necessarily changes within the European Union. We can see this in
Uberseering in various ways. The most obvious is that the decision is based not on national
(private international) law, but on European Union law, a supranational law. The relation
between EU law and national law is in itself a conflict of laws, 132 albeit a special variant vertical instead of horizontal- with special conflicts rules - primacy of EU law on the one
hand, the subsidiarity principle 133 on the other. It tends to be overlooked that Savigny is
aware of the possibility of such vertical conflicts; he is just not very interested in them. His
solution is simple:
"While several laws are subordinate, one to another, the simple rule holds that the law has
always the preference which has the narrowest sphere of application. The only exception to
this rule is the case in which the wider law above it contains special provisions of an absolute
and imperative character". 134

A footnote invokes the adage "Stadtrecht bricht Landrecht, Landrecht bricht gemein
Recht". 135 We could translate this into the principle of subsidiarity 136 - and realize that the
conflicts rule neither captures the primacy ofEU law, nor the complexity of the relation. It
is understandable, therefore, that the relation between EU and national law is not usually
conceptualized as a conflict of laws.

2) Sovereignty and State Interests
This first aspect has an evident impact on state sovereignty: by transferring parts of their
sovereignty to the European Union, the member states evidently have lost some of the
monopoly on regulating their affairs. Yet we can also see a more specific impact on
sovereignty in the decision. The German company seat principle is not a politically neutral
conflicts rule, as Savigny might have conceived it; it sets out to ensure that certain
standards would be upheld by corporations with their effective seat in Germany. 137 The
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incorporation principle (a fruit of the first wave of globalization 138), on the other hand,
gives the founders of a corporation the effective freedom to choose the applicable law. It
represents, therefore, a (deliberate) restraint of the state. By effectively declaring the
German company seat principle irreconcilable with EU law, 139 the Court of Justice strips
the member states of an effective way of regulating corporations with an effective seat in
their territories. The judgment enables corporations to choose the law applicable to them
and thereby, so it is hoped, enables a regulatory competition between the member
states. 140
Regardless of whether one favors or abhors such regulatory competItIOn, It IS an
undeniable challenge to the classical concept of absolute sovereignty. Not only is the state
no longer free to decide on the best policies and must instead bow to the pressure of the
market. Moreover, such a regulatory competition suddenly moves corporations (and even
individuals) from a subordinate to an equal position. Suddenly, they no longer have to obey
state laws, but can instead play out one state's laws against the other's. The Europea Union
disempowers the member state not only vis-a-vis itself, but also vis-a-vis its citizens. It
thereby enhances a general trend of globalization, the growing power of individuals and
corporations, especially multinational enterprises, relative to the state.
Yet Uberseering reveals an odder impact on questions of sovereignty. Effectively,
Germany is obliged to recognize companies which have, under the law of incorporation,
fulfilled all requirements. This could be explained by some kind of enforced comity owed
to other member states, but it is even more reminiscent of the vested rights theory.
Reminiscence of this theory - which Savigny rejects,141 is not accidental. In fact, a
collaborator of the rapporteur in the Court of Justice expressly compares the solution in
Uberseering, as well as an earlier decision 142 to the "Anglo-American theory of vested

138

139
140

141
142
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rights". 143 This invocation of a mostly discarded theory is somewhat odd. Not only is the
territorial basis of the vested rights theory missing in Uberseering - there need not be any
territorial connection to the incorporation state, making the "vesting" a somewhat fleeting
concept. 144 Moreover, the criticisms Wachter pronounced 145 are not answered. The
second of these can be overcome: while one state cannot vest rights and then force
another state to enforce these rights, a superior organization - the European Union can. 146 This is not really different from forcing states to enforce each other's judgments. 147
Yet the first criticism - the circularity of the vested rights approach - remains. Centros is a
prime example: Denmark is asked to enforce the rights vested in Centros Ltd. under the
law of England and Wales and therefore apply English law to it; yet these rights are only
vested provided English law is applicable - a circular argument. Those authors criticizing
the Court of Justice of circular reasoning are thus reaffirming a criticism that is almost 200
years old.

3) De-Territorialization
The result in Uberseering - the dentise of the effective seat principle - is also a step in
de-territorialization. From the beginning it has been difficult to establish the territorial
presence of a company, for the simple reason that companies are creatures of the law with
no (necessary) physical existence, they exist by the law of its creation. 148 The seat
principle takes the company's headquarters for the company itself and thereby reterritorializes the company. The principle ignores, for the purpose of private international
law, the legal separation between the company and its founders and/or leaders. The
incorporation principle, on the other hand, does not seek for any territorial connection unless one considers the place of registration (if necessary) or the place of a post box (for
so-called letterbox companies) a relevant territorial connection. Companies are therefore
accepted to exist, at least before the law, independent from any territorial connection.
This is not only irreconcilable with classical private international law, but possibly with
any private international law based on a state paradigm. As long as the state is by necessity
territorial, such non-territorial aspects pose problems. If a company need not have any
territorial connection with a state but can effectively choose the law applicable to it, why is
it confined to state laws in its choice at all? Small states, especially tax havens, are likely to
cater their company laws to such companies. 149 Why should this be a privilege for states at
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all? 150 Ultimately, companies may be able to exist, by and large, outside the law of states.
This may be desirable to those who do not trust states, but it is precisely for this reason that
it presents a challenge to a private international law based on a state paradigm. These
principles may not exist within the European Union, but certainly on a global level.

4) The Citizenship of Corporations
This problem may also be phrased in the terminology of citizenship. Centros involves
Danish citizens who want to found a company that should be active entirely in Denmark.
The company they found, however, is considered by the Court of Justice to be English. In
what sense can it be said that such a company - after all a legal person - is a "citizen" of the
United Kingdom?151 In which sense is Uberseering a Dutch "citizen"?
The problem is of course that, on the one hand, corporations are not really "citizens" of
any country, and that on the other, Art. 48 EC requires that companies "be treated in the
same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member States". The result is a kind of
"citizenship" that is up for grabs for companies, freely selectable. 152 Selectable citizenship
is irreconcilable with concepts of 19 th century continental law. It certainly does not reflect
ideas about nationality, which traditionally require a certain allegiance (although some
small states are now freely giving away nationality rights for a small fee). This makes it
difficult to speak of the "nationality" of corporations. 153 Yet it is even problematic for the
less political concept of domicile, although this has been used for corporations
frequently.154 Of course, Savigny was aware of the manipulability of his concept of
domicile. 155 But for individuals, changing domicile requires at least a considerable effort
of moving. Such effort is unnecessary for companies that need only register in a state to
become "citizens" of that state. If corporations are legal creatures, then they have no
"domicile" either. In United States Law, citizenship, 156 domicile, 157 and nationality 158 are
defined through incorporation, but there is the awareness that this is a mere fiction. If
European Union law accepts, on the one hand, that corporations are "creatures of the law",
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but on the other hand requires them to be treated like nationals of the member states individuals - this mix creates problems.

v. Conclusion
Of course, determining the law applicable to corporations is not a problem brought
about by globalization; it has existed as long as corporations have. Nothing new under the
sun, therefore? It seems by contrast that the particular constellation of the private
international law of corporations within the European Union reveals several problems
for classical private international law, when faced with challenges that are, even if not
always new, characteristic of globalization.
It appears from the foregoing that traditional private international law, if not necessarily
"obsolete", is at least ill-equipped for globalization. It also appears probable that the
problems stem from the field's intimate connection with the state, a connection that
becomes problematic once the state's role in the world changes. Does that mean that
traditional private international law is a dying species? Or can the discipline be adapted to
the new challenges? Is it possible to supplant sovereignty, territory, and citizenship with
factors that are adequate for globalization? It is not within the scope of this paper to
explore these possibilities. Yet it is likely that such changes will be necessary if the
discipline is to remain relevant in the future.
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